Mohammad Daraghmeh
The Geneva Document, signed by unofficial Israeli and Palestinian
political figures, seemed, to many citizens of the two nations, a flicker of
light in a very dark reality lived by the two parties for over three years.
For the first time since the eruption of the current fight in September
2000, a potential solution, with a large content of realism for emerging out
of a state much like a long war of exhaustion, has appeared on the horizon.
The realism of this document stems from its ability to be implemented, as it
was based on the conclusions achieved by the two parties in their previous
negotiations. The negotiators themselves, who participated in previous
negotiation rounds, picked up from the points where previous rounds left
off.
“Our delegation carried with it maps and documents it acquired during the
last official negotiations in Camp David and Taba with the Ehud Barak
government, and commenced from that point to arrive at the document we have
today”, say Kadura Faris, one of the leaders of the young generation within
the Fatah Movement, and one of the prominent members of the Palestinian
delegation to the Geneva negotiations. Kadura describes the Geneva document
as “the best result reached by the Palestinian party in its negotiations
with Israel since the Madrid Conference in 1991”, referring to the Israeli
team’s acknowledgement of the Palestinians’ right to an independent state on
all the lands occupied in 1967, with minor border modifications.
The Geneva Documents stipulates that settlements shall be combined in
groups occupying 2.6% of the West Bank area, and Palestinians in return are
compensated with lands in the Gaza and Hebron areas. Palestinian-Israeli
negotiations documents show that the most that Labour governments ever gave
to Palestinians in previous negotiations did not exceed 91% of the West Bank
lands. It must be pointed out here that various national and Islamic
Palestinian factions are in consensus over the fact that the independent
Palestinian State represents the main objective of the Palestinian people.
The Document also sends a very important message to the Israeli street,
from which the Palestinian position has been absent in the confrontation
whirlpool, where the voices of the right-wing and extremism rise high above
all others. “The Palestinian position in the Geneva Document presents a
response to the Israeli and American claims that there is no Palestinian
partner for peace”, says Dr. Khalil Shiqaqi, one of the most prominent
Palestinian researchers and analysts. “The Palestinians proved to the
Israeli street that they are partners, and it is now up to the peace powers
in Israel to fight the election battle, take the leadership and grab the
opportunity to achieve peace for both nations, based on this Document”, adds
Shiqaqi.
The Geneva Document carries an equilibrium that provides it with an
opportunity to be accepted by both nations, although some or perhaps many of
them accept it rather reluctantly. In this Document, the Palestinian party
achieves its objectives of a Palestinian state on lands occupied in 1967,
with Jerusalem as its capital, and a solution to the refugee problem that
provides for the right of return, in principle. The Document also comprises
a solution to water problems based on sharing rights to common aquifers, and
a solution to the prisoners problem whereby 90% of the prisoners are
released in the first year and the rest over a thirty-month period. The
Document also proposes a safe passageway between the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip.
The Document provides Israel with a solution to the settlements issue by
combining settlements in clusters, a solution in Jerusalem that gives it
control of the Wailing Wall and the Jewish Quarter, and freedom from the
“ghost” of millions of Palestinian refugees that the Hebrew state views as a
source of danger threatening its existence.
Many observers in Israel view this Document as a basis for reaching an
acceptable settlement if adequate climates prevail. “The current situation
does not provide for the success of the Document, but when they get better,
i.e. when the fighting stops, the Israeli public opinion may resort to it as
an acceptable framework for a solution, or as a bridge that takes us to
one”, says the former Israeli diplomat, Victor Nahmias. He adds: “The Geneva
Document represents an initiative of hope, but the climate of war, that is
not conducive to open minds and hearts, has obscured it”.
The Document affected the prevailing right-wing government in two
directions. The first is that the Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and
his deputy Ehud Olmert resorted to talking about a solution plan based on
unilateral measures. The second is that the government resorted to a
military escalation that has displaced the Document as the main subject of
dialogue on public opinion. But observers in Israel see the Document as a
moment of truth that will, by necessity, return to the middle stage, after
realizing the limitations of military power. Nahmias adds: “The continued
bloody clashes obscured the Document. Under conditions of killing,
assassination and violence, hope and optimism recede, and priority is given
to talk about violence and putting an end to it. But when the parties
realize the limits of their powers, priorities will change and the Document
will assume its position in seeking a solution and a settlement to the
conflict, next to other peace initiatives, such as the Nusseibeh-Ayalon
one”. He adds quickly “…and this will happen sooner or later. Israel will
realize the limitations of its power. Its superior army will not vanquish
the Palestinians, who will also realize that force will not compel Israel to
change its positions”.
As much as it carries “pleasant” accomplishments for the two parties, the
Geneva Document also carries “painful concessions” that represent the price
for any potential settlement between them. These concessions represent
obstacles that still persist and prevent them from reaching the majorities
among their nations. On the Palestinian side, many activists within the
refugee-rights circles express, in principle, objection to the Document.
Tayseer Nasrallah, head of the Committee for Defending Refugee Rights,
with headquarters in the city of Nablus says: “The way we understand its
text, the Document clearly abandons the right of return of five million
refugees.
This is unacceptable to those refugees and to all the Palestinian
people”.
But Dr. Khalil Shiqaqi does not see that the Document abandons the
principle of the right of return, although it made concessions where return
mechanisms are concerned. “In principle, the Document considers UN
resolution 194 and the Arab Initiative launched at the Beirut summit
conference as a basis for the solution. This does not imply abandoning the
right of return, but rather that return mechanisms give Israel the right to
decide the numbers of returning refugees, which represents a concession”.
Shiqaqi quickly adds, referring to the results of a survey conducted by
the Palestinian Policy Research centre he runs, which indicated that only a
limited number of refugees wish to return to Israel: “But the more important
question is, are there many refugees who want to return to Israel or not?”
The Palestinian side to the Geneva Document has pragmatic reasons that
justify the concessions included in this controversial item of the Document.
“Let us be realistic. There is only one method of returning five million
Palestinian refugees to Israel. It is simply ‘Against them make ready your
strength to the utmost of your power, including steeds of war”, as the Holy
Koran bids, but is this realistic?” wonders Kadura Faris, the
Parliamentarian and Minister who enjoys large credibility among the
Palestinian public.
The balanced content of the Geneva Document makes it a basis for any
potential solution in future. As Dr. Shiqaqi says: “If there is ever an
opportunity for a political settlement, it will always be within the Geneva
Document framework”.
