Israel's experience of negotiating with both Syria and the PLO began some
13 years ago in Madrid. Since then, the key tactical questions have been whether
to negotiate with these two actors simultaneously or sequentially and, if
sequentially, with whom to begin.
Previous experience is so diverse as to be of little help. In 1948-49 Israel
negotiated armistice agreements with all its state neighbors (not the
Palestinians) in quick succession. In 1977-79 it negotiated solely with Egypt,
which even took upon itself to represent the Palestinian cause in framing the
Camp David agreements. In 1994 PM Yitzhak Rabin negotiated secretly with Jordan
during the Oslo I discussions with the PLO, but for historic, geographic and
demographic reasons the circumstances of the Jordan-PLO-Israel triangle were
very different from those involving Syria.
Since Madrid, various Israeli leaders have treated the issue differently.
Former Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir negotiated under duress with both
Syria and the Palestinians simultaneously, but he apparently sought to ensure
that neither track would succeed. Prime Ministers Rabin, Peres and Barak at
various times gave priority to the Syrian track. They reasoned that an early
agreement with Syria, and by extension with Lebanon, would round out the circle
of peace around Israel and deprive the Islamist and secular Palestinian radical
terrorist organizations of support, thereby leaving the PLO in a weaker
negotiating position. Indeed, to some extent it was also assumed that the very
fact of highly publicized parallel negotiations with Syria and the PLO would
render both more flexible.
Prime Minister Netanyahu also gave priority to the Syrian track. But he kept
his talks with the Syrians a secret, while his negotiations with the
Palestinians were in any case confined to limited goals, i.e., withdrawal from
Hebron and the Wye River agreement. Some Israeli leaders, like Rabin, opined
that the Israeli public was in any case not capable of "absorbing" two
simultaneous agreements with Arab neighbors that involved territorial
concessions. Virtually all appeared to believe that a deal with Syria would have
broader geo-strategic benefits for Israel, would be far less complicated to
negotiate and, in terms of territorial concessions and immediate benefits, would
be easier for the Israeli public to accept.
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon is basically not interested in negotiating with
either Syria or the PLO if this means making significant Israeli territorial
concessions or offering confidence building measures. Thanks to Sharon and
Palestinian Authority leader Yasser Arafat, there is no peace process with the
PLO. The PLO/Palestinian Authority is so weak, and anarchy so rampant, that
Israel may not have a viable Palestinian partner anyway. Hence talks with Syria
can hardly be conceptualized as a tactic for exercising political leverage
vis-à-vis the Palestinians.
The key to understanding this situation and its costs and benefits for Israel
lies in post-9/11 American policies in the region. Thanks to the US war on
terrorism and occupation of Iraq, Israel's regional strategic situation has
never been so good: there is no threat of conventional war, and a powerful
American ally is targeting the weapons of mass destruction and Islamic terrorism
that threaten Israel. Radical countries like Syria, Libya and Iran are in
various ways beginning to seek to accommodate Washington. There is little if any
American pressure on Israel to make concessions or even to negotiate with Syria
or the PLO. Indeed, the current situation, in which Syrian President Bashar Asad
is offering to renew negotiations without pre-conditions and Washington does not
take the initiative to mediate between Damascus and Jerusalem, is without
precedent.
If only the neo-conservatives in Washington knew where to draw the line in
Israel's case! By allowing and even encouraging Sharon not to talk to Asad, they
are sending a message to the Arab world that neither they nor Israel are
interested in peace. Sending ambiguous and half-hearted protests to Jerusalem
regarding the fence, the outposts, and Sharon's plan to reduce settlements in
Gaza and thicken them in the West Bank, the Americans are enabling and
encouraging him to create an apartheid reality that is the very antithesis of
the democratization that they preach for the region.
Suppose, for the sake of argument, that Sharon accepted Asad's initiative and
agreed to negotiate. The results could hardly be negative. If indeed Syria is
weak, confused and in need of improved relations with the US, then Israel might
get a better territorial deal than anything offered to it in the past. If not,
it at least displayed a readiness to talk peace with a neighbor. As for the
Palestinian sphere, Israel could demand that the first item on its agenda with
Syria be Hizballah's activities, not only in southern Lebanon but in fomenting
terrorism in the West Bank and Gaza. To the extent that an Israeli-Syrian
agreement looks possible, this might encourage Yasser Arafat to take security
steps that would stabilize Israeli-Palestinian relations and set the stage for
renewed negotiations.
Even if Israeli-Syrian talks are once again doomed to failure, we have little
to lose by trying.