By Hanan Ashrawi
The American-cum-Quartet draft road map for a permanent
two-state solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict has already come up
against its major Israeli roadblocks.
Beyond Sharon's initial dismissive attitude, Israeli
responses have ranged from a total rejection of the June 4, 1967 borders, to
the negation of the establishment of the Palestinian state, to the refusal
to cease settlement activities and dismantle any settlements, to the
rejection of any binding timetables, to the elimination of any aspect of
monitoring or third party involvement, to further demands and preconditions
specifically designed to abort the initiative (including collection of
Palestinian weapons, arrest of "suspects," the total cessation of
"violence," the political "elimination" of President Arafat, comprehensive
Palestinian "reform," among other dictates).
By now, Israeli tactics have become all too familiar. After
sabotaging the substance, Israel proceeds to raise procedural and technical
objections with the aim of prolongation and obfuscation. Thus with the
parties totally bogged down in micromanaging the most obscure detail and
side issue, Israel buys more time to create more facts to render the whole
exercise entirely irrelevant.
In the meantime, the US would have bought the artificial
"calm" it needs to carry out its regional designs (beginning with Iraq) and
placating the Arab world by creating the impression of "engagement" and
commitment to the implementation of the presidential "vision" of a two-state
solution.
Meanwhile, Israel is off the hook, continuing its
business-as-usual policy of studied cruelty against and systematic
destruction of Palestinian reality and lives while voraciously gobbling up
more land and feeding the settlers' insatiable appetite for intimidation,
violence, and expansion.
Regardless of the motivation and/or obstructionism, the road
map requires a serious Palestinian assessment and response from the
conceptual, procedural, and substantive point of view.
Conceptually, the plan still assumes that gradualism
in the form of a phased approach is capable of designing a process that can
produce results. Past experience has provided us with sufficient evidence
that the failure of the peace process was due in large part to its
non-incremental gradualism that allowed for prolongation and stalling while
giving the powerful party time and opportunity to create facts that would
undermine the objective. Only an acceleration of the timeframe
would prevent the negative exploitation of the time bought by Israel by
deliberate obstructionism.
This is especially true of a process that is
"Performance-Based"
instead of relying on clear and objective criteria, requirements, and
timelines. Given the asymmetry of power, Israel will continue to hamper
Palestinian "performance" by using its unhampered military power to create
insurmountable obstacles and to provoke extreme responses and reactions. A
clear example is Israel's use of the policy of assassination to create
further instability, violence, a sense of victimization, and a cycle of
lawlessness and revenge. A performance- driven road map will lead only in
the direction of an Israeli-driven disaster.
Combined with conditionality, especially as
defined by the Israeli occupation, the process becomes subject to an endless
reservoir of Israeli preconditions that are essentially impossible to
fulfill, given the fact that Israel can pursue a policy of destroying
precisely those conditions that would prevent Palestinian "compliance." The
repeated assaults on the Palestinian leadership, and the presidency in
particular, with arrogant attempts at "delegitimizing" or rendering
"irrelevant" the elected leader of the Palestinians are the most blatant
evidence of such tactics. Combined with the policy of siege, humiliation,
and deprivation the conditions of "acquiescence" become entirely
unattainable.
The disparity in conditions and lack of
parity in framing the rights and responsibilities of both parties stem from
ignoring the culpability of the occupation (hence the
occupying party) in the first place. The unbridled use of force by the
Israeli occupation forces and the inherent racism in the mentality of
subjugation has rendered reciprocity completely
inapplicable and unfair. Never before has the victim been held accountable
for the conditions of his/her own victimization while the perpetrator's
demands become the criteria for gauging the victim's behavior. "Self
defense" for the occupation is an oxymoron, in the same way as "blaming the
victim" is unjust and illogical. Violence against civilians is morally
reprehensible and repugnant regardless of the identity of the perpetrator,
but it becomes even more so when the act of commission is a result of
official government policy in "defense" of an indefensible occupation and is
being carried out against a whole captive and defenseless occupation. Thus
demanding "normalcy" in the midst of a situation of abnormality becomes a
flight of fancy.
Furthermore, the glaring lack of arbitration
and clearly defined mechanisms of accountability would
render the role of third parties largely symbolic, hence
ineffective. The Quartet is given the role of facilitating Palestinian
reform, elections, and Palestinian-Israeli security cooperation and
coordination, while it is instructed to establish a "monitoring mechanism"
(phase I, second stage) to be "enhanced" in "monitoring transition" in phase
II. Both International Conferences (phase II and III) are to be convened by
the Quartet; the first is for the purpose of supporting Palestinian
"economic recovery" and to launch bilateral negotiations "on the possibility
of a state with provisional borders"; the second is designed to "endorse"
bilateral agreements and to launch further bilateral negotiations "toward a
final, permanent status resolution in 2005."
Both the timing and the unspecified
mandate of the "monitoring mechanism" betray a feeble effort at
doing too little too late. The rapidly deteriorating situation on the
ground, the entrenchment of violence and extremism, and the loss of
confidence with an increase in hostility and distrust, all require immediate
and effective concrete engagement in the field. With "occupation on the
rampage" being reinstated as the norm, and with the "security fence" (along
with feverish settlement expansion) creating an apartheid situation in the
projected Palestine, the most appropriate separation and de-escalation
mechanism becomes the deployment of fully empowered international forces in
the occupied territory. The dual objective of devolution of occupation and
evolution of statehood requires direct third party supervision and viable
involvement with a mandate for arbitration and accountability.
Clearly, the logic of the previous peace process has proved
to be a failure, not least in its insistence on bilateralism
as a means of "conflict resolution" in a situation of such glaring power
bias and disequilibrium. If multilateralism is the global
mechanism for collective responsibility, particularly in peace-making and in
ensuring a global rule of law, then the "monitoring mechanism" of the road
map must embody such an approach both in form and in substance. Such logic
requires rethinking the Quartet (and its selective partners in the "octet"
and the Arab addenda). The UN must remain the reference to (not the partner
of) state and multi-state actors; full Arab partnership must be ensured
throughout (and not just in a perfunctory and occasional manner); and
behavior on the ground must be subject to scrutiny and immediate
intervention.
In this way, the micromanagement of and interference
in Palestinian realities would become legitimate as a form of
positive intervention in an ongoing conflict that is rapidly
spiraling out of control and in engineering a workable and fair solution.
Thus violations of Palestinian democracy and negative intervention in
internal realities in such issues as ignoring presidential elections and
insisting on an "empowered Prime Minister" would be avoided and left to the
independent domestic agenda and requirements. Similarly (and without
addressing all the minute details of Palestinian institution-building and
reform), the narrow and specific focus on "legal reform," constitutional
commission, Election Commission, restructuring of security forces, travel of
Palestinian officials, etc. would be replaced with the more expansive
approach of providing the proper conditions for the Palestinians to engage
in a nation building process unfettered by Israeli impediments and
sequential conditionality. The Palestinian constituency for peace and
democracy must be empowered by democratic means.
Israel, on the other hand, and as the occupying power, must
be held accountable in accordance with the Fourth Geneva Conventions and
other relevant international charters and agreements. Means of enforcement
rather than abstract questions of applicability are the real issue. Israel's
implementation of UN resolutions (for example, withdrawal in accordance with
UNSC resolutions 1402, 1403, and 1435) are issues of immediate
compliance rather than persuasion and rewards. Selectivity
in citing the Tenet work plan and the Mitchell report (however inadequate)
will also become an encouragement for further Israeli contempt and
non-compliance.
The most dangerous implications of this approach are in its
handling of the Israeli settlement policy. Although
numerous UN resolutions and international conventions and agreements (and
even American statements) have repeatedly designated settlements as being
"illegal" and an "obstacle to peace," nevertheless Israel has been allowed
to pursue its settlement building, subsidizing and expansion unchecked. With
the violence and lawlessness of the settlers and with the fragmentation of
Palestinian territory and the extraterritoriality inherent in the "by-pass
roads," Israel is not only escalating the conflict; it is making the
solution impossible. By asking Israel to dismantle "settlement outposts
erected since the establishment of the present Israeli government" (phase I,
first stage), then to "freeze all settlement activity consistent with the
Mitchell report (phase I, second stage), then to carry out "further action
on settlements simultaneous with establishment of Palestinian state with
provisional borders (phase II), the road map allows for sufficient
prolongation to enable Israel to destroy any chance of a two-state solution
or a just peace. The charade of disappearing/reappearing outposts attests to
the inadvisability of beginning confrontation over isolated and minor
locations when the massive settlements are the ones that should be addressed
first. Any "freeze," of course, will be met with the same disdain disregard
as sealed the fate of the Mitchell report. Finally, the vague language on
"further action" certainly affords Israel the opportunity to abort any final
agreement.
Prejudicial and illegal Israeli measures in
Jerusalem also require firm and immediate intervention pertaining
to the siege and isolation, settlement activity, closure of Palestinian
institutions, home demolition, withholding of building permits for
Palestinians, and ID confiscation. By restricting all mention of Jerusalem
to the reopening of "East Jerusalem Chamber of Commerce and other closed
Palestinian economic institutions," the road map makes sure that there will
be no "East Jerusalem" to speak of once permanent status talks are launched
in phase III and with the convening of the second International Conference.
By that time, the historical, political, cultural, demographic, and
territorial identity of East Jerusalem would have been distorted beyond
recognition-and certainly beyond its designated role as capital of
Palestine.
The state with "provisional borders," while a unique
invention, still offers no promise and no guarantees that
the interim would not become permanent. Sharon has openly "accepted" the
idea of a Palestinian "entity" (call it what you will) on 42% of the West
Bank (minus Jerusalem) and Gaza with a possibility of an additional 6-8% in
final status. Unless the road map clearly spells out the June 4, 1967
borders as being the boundaries of the Palestinian state,
the whole exercise runs the risk of generating further conflict and serving
Sharon's plans of further land theft and expansionism.
While the preamble laudably refers to clear principles,
criteria, UN resolutions, and agreements as the foundations of the road map,
it is not clear that the mechanisms themselves are consistent with these
references. "The settlement [that] will end the occupation began in 1967"
may do so by restoring the land to its rightful Palestinian owners, by
allowing for Israeli annexation of the land, or by a combination of both.
However, taken in their entirety, the terms of reference as
a whole must be translated to shape the conduct and outcome of negotiations.
It cannot be acceptable to revert to the tired dictum that anything the
parties agree to will be considered an implementation of the relevant
resolution. Nor are resolutions to be interpreted and/or amended to suit the
stronger party. The Arab initiative contains within it a comprehensive and
legal formula for an acceptable settlement, and can thus serve as the
touchstone for any solution.
The vast majority of the Palestinian people remain committed
to a peaceful resolution and to the two-state solution despite the Israeli
government's persistent attempts to destroy both. These options, however,
are rapidly becoming unattainable if the current conditions are allowed to
continue and to deteriorate. Already voices calling for the one-state
solution, whether in the form of a bi-national state or a secular democratic
state, are gaining support and credibility. If the current hard line
government in Israel persists in its destructive policies and measures, such
a solution will become the only option as the de facto outcome of its
extremism. The other side of the coin of "Greater Israel" replacing all of
historical Palestine (and more) is that of "One Palestine." In the meantime,
the painful suffering and tragic loss of life will continue, while both
peoples and the whole region are made to pay the price of Sharon's revival
of Zionist fundamentalism.
To see the U.S. Road Map Draft click below:
http://www.miftah.org/Display.cfm?DocId=1220&CategoryId=10
http://www.miftah.org
October 28, 2002