bitterlemons-international.org
Middle East Roundtable / Edition 46-2008

An Israeli View (II):
Replaying the 2006 Lebanon War

by Yisrael Harel

After nearly three days and nights of bombing the Gaza Strip, we can with considerable certainty specify the strategic objective that Israel wants to achieve from this expansive bombing campaign. In the language of many spokespersons, it is to "create a new security reality".

But can waves of bombing, however accurate, achieve such a goal? In Lebanon, Israel learned the hard way that a modus operandi consisting mainly of aerial bombing does not defeat the enemy. It was Hizballah and not Israel that was seen across the Middle East and beyond as the winner in that war. The reasoning is simple: due to the danger to enemy civilian lives Israel is not free, nor does it seek, to exploit its advantage in the air to score a decisive victory.

As in Lebanon, the psychological momentum needed for creating a new reality is dissipating with every additional hour of bombing that is not accompanied by a ground operation. I fear that Israel's civilian and military leaders are plagued by a mental block that is not even influenced by the lessons of Lebanon. The air operation this time is better than then, but the strategy--which does not pursue the objective of decisive victory--and the modus operandi are distressingly similar.

Air strikes can indeed generate a "new security reality"; they did, for example, in World War II. But even if Israel has the technical capability, it will not pursue such an objective at a cost of heavy Palestinian civilian losses. True, the Gaza bombings are accurate and cause relatively few civilian losses. And the destruction of rocket storage depots along the philadelphi strip was undoubtedly an intelligence and operational triumph. Yet an air strategy alone cannot create a new security reality in Gaza. When Israel is compelled to end the bombings--and we are not far from the moment when external pressures from Europe and America bend the will of the Israeli leadership, which is always too accommodating toward such pressures--most of Hamas' war-fighting infrastructure will be destroyed but its grip on the Strip will remain strong and perhaps even be stronger.

The situation could look different had Israel dared to introduce ground forces into the Strip in conjunction with the air offensive. While this might have placed some soldiers in harm's way, this is the only way Israel could deal with Hamas and its combat echelon and generate far-reaching political change. Such an operation, like "Defensive Shield" in Judea and Samaria in 2002, would enable Israel not only to destroy Hamas' human and technical infrastructure but also to set up its own intelligence infrastructure in the Strip, just as it did in 2002 in Nablus, Ramallah, Jenin and the other cities of Judea and Samaria. After Defensive Shield, Israel left those cities, but ever since then, when it receives intelligence concerning plans to launch suicide bombings and other operations against its civilians, Israel's forces return to any city almost unimpeded and apprehend the terrorists.

This is the minimal outcome to which Israel should aspire in Operation Cast Lead as well. Yet because it is avoiding a ground campaign, it cannot establish in Gaza the kind of network it set up in Judea and Samaria. Hence, following a ceasefire modeled on UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which ended the Second Lebanon War, peace and quiet may be maintained in Israel's southern communities for a bit longer than usual. But in the end, the rockets will fall once again when Hamas, after rearming, chooses to launch them.

Israel's reticence to deploy ground forces will generate an additional and very negative outcome from Israel's standpoint: it will prove to the enemy that Israel's painful Achilles' heel is the fear of loss of life among its troops. This fear, which led Hizballah leader Hassan Nasrallah to liken Israel to a cobweb, is causing Israel heavy damage. The disdainful declarations from Tehran regarding the "Zionist entity's" capacity to survive--and Iran's preparations to make good on its mocking predictions--are one of the results.

It stands to reason that an Israeli ground invasion of the Gaza Strip would end up the same way its entry into Palestinian cities did in 2002: nearly without casualties (with the exception of an unnecessary complication in Jenin) and with maximum results in terms of damage inflicted on the terrorists. But the convoy of Israeli tanks moving south for all to see two days ago and the call-up of reserves that was also ballyhooed to the public do not necessarily mean a ground operation is near. With every passing hour, this becomes a less likely option because of outside interference that has already begun. Had the government of Israel really sought to create a new security reality it would have introduced ground forces immediately following the "shock and awe" bombing of the enemy that so upset its equilibrium on Saturday. When this did not happen, the forces sent south found themselves engaged in psychological warfare--not real war.- Published 29/12/2008 © bitterlemons.org

Yisrael Harel heads the Institute for Zionist Strategy in Jerusalem and writes a weekly political column in Haaretz. He is former head of the Yesha Council (Council of Jewish Settlements in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District) and former editor of its monthly Nekuda.

Bitterlemons-international.org is an internet forum for an array of world perspectives on the Middle East and its specific concerns. It aspires to engender greater understanding about the Middle East region and open a new common space for world thinkers and political leaders to present their viewpoints and initiatives on the region. Editors Ghassan Khatib and Yossi Alpher can be reached at ghassan@bitterlemons-international.org and yossi@bitterlemons-international.org, respectively.

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