bitterlemons-international.org
Middle East Roundtable / Edition 44-2008

An Israeli View:
Judea and Samaria syndrome

by Barry Rubin

There is no excuse for those settlers who recently attacked and vandalized Palestinian people and property in Hebron and elsewhere. They should be arrested, put on trial and, if found guilty, punished. Without question, they only harm Israel's citizens and interests by such behavior.

At the same time, though, it should be remembered that this riot happened because Israel's government removed settlers from a building in Hebron. That is, this was an attempt to limit settlements, keep Israeli commitments and hold open options for a peace agreement in which far more settlements would be dismantled.

Beyond the immediate headlines about these incidents, several important points should be kept in mind.

It is simply not true to say that settlements are the main, or even a main barrier to peace. Most obviously, if settlements are so atrocious in Palestinian eyes, this should be an incentive to making an agreement that would eliminate them. If, for example, the Palestinian leadership had agreed to begin serious negotiations at Camp David or accepted the Clinton plan in 2000, today there would be an independent Palestinian state with no Jewish settlements existing on its territory.

Second, the removal of settlements in the past has not sparked any change in Palestinian positions or behavior on such issues as terrorism or official incitement to anti-Israel violence. The Israeli government dismantled all settlements and withdrew from the Gaza Strip with the result of, first, undiminished Palestinian hostility and, second, the Hamas takeover. Indeed, abandoned settlements in Gaza were turned into bases for launching more attacks on Israel.

What is often forgotten is that the government at the same time dismantled settlements in several areas of the West Bank and announced its willingness to withdraw completely from more territory there. This, too, made no difference in the situation and there was no Palestinian Authority response that encouraged further such measures.

The main barrier to peace, of course, is the inability and unwillingness of the PA leadership to make a comprehensive agreement leading to a two-state solution coupled with an end to conflict and violence along with the resettlement of Palestinian refugees in a Palestinian state.

We are thus in a long interim period in which the hopes of comprehensive peace are zero, despite the unrealistic talk about peace being at hand if only some new gimmick is implemented or Israel makes enough unilateral concessions.

Yet even though a fully successful diplomatic process is not possible--indeed, because of that fact--Israel has several policy priorities. One is to show the world that it is striving to build toward ultimate peace. A second is to limit friction with the Palestinians in the West Bank, reducing violence and loss of life whenever possible, while a third is to maximize cooperation with the PA on easing the situation and reining in violence.

In addition, a fourth consideration is to preserve the best possible strategic situation for the Israeli army to operate in a way that minimizes casualties. One of the main reasons for the earlier redeployments was to improve the lines of defense for the country and avoid highly risky situations for soldiers. The actions of settlers, especially the creation or expansion of isolated settlements and the resulting need to secure additional roads, places not only settlers but also soldiers' lives at risk.

At all times it must be made clear that it is Israel's government and not vigilantism or the decisions of settlers that will determine policy. This is not to criticize or demonize all or even most of the settlers, who have been law-abiding, but it is well known that there are extremist forces at work that endanger Israel's security, seek to engage in reprehensible actions and even view Israel's government as an enemy. The assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin was the ultimate expression of that malady, which we could call the Judea and Samaria syndrome.

In that psychological illness known as the Jerusalem syndrome, people who go to that holy city are convinced that they are messiahs, prophets or various biblical figures. Judea and Samaria syndrome has somewhat parallel effects. Sufferers believe that settling the land will bring the messiah, that they are the saviors of Israel and that the country's elected leaders are fools or traitors.

One irony of Judea and Samaria syndrome is that it turns people who are nominally the most dedicated Zionists into anti-Zionists. That is, for the existence of a strong, healthy Jewish state they substitute the idol of possessing this or that specific piece of real estate whose ownership becomes more important than anything else. They take into their own hands decisions that do not belong to them. In some cases, they would prefer to stay in Hebron rather than to live in Israel. Again, these points only address a small minority of settlers but they have become a significant force.

In the 1970s and 1980s, the acceptance of the settlements as a national imperative and as a good thing was widespread in Israel. Today, that is not so. Political support for both settlement and the settlers in general has fallen steeply.

After the peace hopes of the 1990s were dashed, the attitude today is one of pragmatism. Israel will hold onto territories for security until there is a full peace. At the same time, it is recognized that this peace is far off. Additional settlement serves no purpose and--depending on the political perspective of the individual Israeli--many, most or all will be dismantled some day after a negotiated agreement is achieved and implemented. Will settler violence or threats prevent that from happening? Not at all. The prize of real peace is so great that the country would not let a tiny minority prevent it from happening. Equally, however, the country will not take risks, make sacrifices and face such an internal conflict in return for anything short of full, real, equitable and lasting peace.- Published 15/12/2008 © bitterlemons.org

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), the paperback edition of The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan) and The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley).

Bitterlemons-international.org is an internet forum for an array of world perspectives on the Middle East and its specific concerns. It aspires to engender greater understanding about the Middle East region and open a new common space for world thinkers and political leaders to present their viewpoints and initiatives on the region. Editors Ghassan Khatib and Yossi Alpher can be reached at ghassan@bitterlemons-international.org and yossi@bitterlemons-international.org, respectively.

hagalil.com 17-12-2008