bitterlemons-international.org
Middle East Roundtable /
Edition 46
An Israeli View:
Nothing is more stable than the provisional
by Amnon Lord
The weekend papers in Israel were full of
the Sharon speech at Herzliya, giving it the usual spin of optimism. Prime
Minister Ariel Sharon talked about the possibility of coordinating the
Israeli withdrawal with the Palestinians, but his pathos of historic
optimism was directed toward the Israeli public, describing the coming year
2005 as a year of historic opportunity to change Israel's strategic
situation from the bottom up.
I looked for the words peace or Palestinian
state and didn't find them, even though on the radio, right after the
speech, the impression was created that Sharon said the Palestinians could
establish their state in the coming year. But what was reported off-hand in
a closing sentence was that Abu Mazen (Mahmoud Abbas) was negative in his
reaction to Sharon, saying: "Sharon is the obstacle to peace. We reject his
declarations as a whole and one by one".
The two factors that combine to strengthen
Sharon's position of unilateralism are the death of Yasser Arafat and the
reelection of George W. Bush. When Sharon is talking of an historic
opportunity he means that, indeed, Israel is in some ways entering into
favorable strategic conditions almost to the extent of the opportunities
which were opened 15 years ago with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Not
only was the rear guard of the Arab enemies of Israel broken then, but a
major Arab enemy was crushed in 1991, thus creating what seemed like a very
favorable environment. Then came the Oslo accords and the opportunity was
lost, ushering in instead a new era of terrorism, the politics of mass
murder.
Sharon's opportunity now is to tear Israel
from the clutches of peace negotiations with the Palestinians as well as
other Arab countries. The kind of unilateralism embodied in disengagement
means that Israel regains control over its own fate, abandoning for good the
dangerous premise that its existential problem will be solved only in
accordance with the solution of the Palestinians' problems. A Palestinian
state now becomes only an option that Israel does not exclude, about which
it remains for the Palestinians to decide.
Abu Mazen's rejection of Sharon's speech
clearly indicates that he does not share Sharon's optimism. He sees the new
conditions as constraining for the Palestinians. However, Sharon's plan
gives enough room for Abu Mazen to gain control and concentrate on internal
Palestinian affairs for the next year or two. If terrorism subsides, Abu
Mazen will face a dilemma after completion of the Israeli disengagement: he
will probably demand from Israel and the US to go back to negotiations.
Since the main idea of disengagement is already political, Israel under
Sharon will be reluctant. Abu Mazen's legitimacy will be based on his
ability to deliver at the negotiating table. If this venue is basically
closed, he will lose legitimacy and Palestinian terrorism will resume.
This is where the Labor party differs from
Sharon. Labor's entrance into the government is clearly a limited alignment.
Labor sees in disengagement only the aspects of withdrawal and dismantling
of settlements. But it does not share the strategic principle that underlies
the disengagement plan, and that actually delays the establishment of a
Palestinian state and negates a negotiated peace. The future of a
Likud-Labor partnership largely depends on how far the unilateral withdrawal
goes and how long the process takes. Potentially, the initial withdrawal
from northern Samaria might end up as a long stretch of land all the way to
southern Mount Hebron, leaving in the hands of the Palestinians all the
private lands of the West Bank, while Israel retains all the state-owned
lands.
This process of partitioning the West Bank
may take years, but during that period a long-term partnership between the
Likud and the Labor party might emerge. This may lead both parties, as
coalition-partners, all the way to the next elections in November 2006.
Afterwards, continuation of this new political alliance will depend on the
Likud being able to preserve its current strength in the Knesset, and
continuation of Israel's new unilateral policy might depend on the
Labor-Likud alliance.
Meanwhile, this alliance depends on the
current relative strength of both parties. Paradoxically, if the Likud
weakens in the next elections and Labor regains strength--the Likud will
drift rightward and Labor to the left. Under these circumstances, the Likud
loses its current position as the axis of the political system, and it will
inevitably need the right wing parties to form a government.
Meanwhile, Sharon remains the preferred
leader of the Israeli public, which seems to favor the Likud-Labor alliance.
With Sharon in place this partnership could last for several years.-
Published 20/12/2004 (c) bitterlemons.org
Amnon Lord is the editor of the weekly newspaper Makor
Rishon.
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21-12-2004 |