bitterlemons-international.org
Middle East Roundtable /
Edition 22
AN ISRAELI VIEW:
Learn from historic mistakes
by Yossi Alpher
The West Bank separation fence works. It keeps out terrorists, and for that
matter illegal Palestinian immigrants and car thieves too. It has made a
major contribution to a radical reduction in Palestinian suicide bombings
over recent months. It stands to reason that it must encompass the Jerusalem
area as well. The Israeli
authorities, faced with the need to delineate a path for the fence in
Jerusalem, have adhered mainly to the expanded municipal boundaries created
by Israel in 1967. That decision is causing hardship to tens of thousands of
Palestinian Jerusalemites and their immediate neighbors in the surrounding
West Bank. The ugliest manifestation is the eight meter high wall in Abu
Dis. So problematic are large sections of the Jerusalem area fence/wall that
dozens of High Court appeals have frozen its progress. Even the Ministry of
Defense planners of the fence realize they have a fiasco on their hands.
In order to find a better way to build the fence, we need to
recall how we got ourselves into this mess in the first place. When the dust
settled from the 1967 Six-Day War, Israeli intelligence assessed that we
would shortly be subjected to heavy American and Soviet pressures to
withdraw from all the territories we had just occupied. This assumption was
based on the precedent of two previous wars, in 1948-49 and 1956, when we
were obliged by great power demands to withdraw from portions of southern
Lebanon and the Sinai Peninsula. A
hasty deliberation in June 1967 by the Israeli unity government of the day
determined that we could preempt the anticipated pressures by "creating
facts" that would make it difficult to force us to withdraw from at least
one occupied area: East Jerusalem with its Jewish holy and historic sites. A
committee was established to define the borders of the East Jerusalem area
destined for annexation. Here began a process that seemed logical at the
time, but can only be described in retrospect as an act of folly.
Based on the assumption that peace with our neighbors was
unlikely, that nearly all the territories would soon be returned, and that
beyond the bounds of Jerusalem we would once again confront the Jordanian
Arab Legion, the decision was taken to expand the borders of East Jerusalem
to render them defensible by encompassing the hilltops to the east, north
and south of the city from which Jordanian troops had shot at Israelis
during the years between 1948 and 1967. That pushed the new border to places
like the village of Sur Baher to the east. Further, yielding to the
assessment of then-Mayor Teddy Kollek that Jerusalem could once again come
under siege as in 1948 and would need to be resupplied more efficiently, a
finger of municipal territory was drawn to the north, almost to al Bireh, to
encompass the landing strip at Qalandia.
Consequently, instead of annexing a few thousand Palestinian
Arab residents in the Old City and Mount of Olives and Mount Scopus
areas--the places that interested Israel from an historic and religious
standpoint--we annexed some 70,000 Palestinians in 1967. Most of the annexed
Palestinians lived in areas that interact on a daily basis with the
surrounding West Bank, for which East Jerusalem remains the commercial,
educational, medical, religious, and cultural center. These have now become
more than 200,000 residents, interacting with an even larger number in the
nearby Ramallah and Bethlehem areas. To ensure the impossibility of
returning to the old lines, we have built extensive Jewish neighborhoods in
the annexed parts of the city, thereby creating a virtually inseparable
ethnic/religious mosaic. Needless to
say, none of the pessimistic assessments that underpinned Israel's Jerusalem
annexation scheme ever came to pass. The United States and Soviet Union
never pressed for withdrawal; the vicissitudes of Israel-Arab and Arab-Arab
interactions led the Jordanians to abdicate any intention of returning to
the West Bank; and all parties accept that an eventual Palestinian state
will be demilitarized, hence unable to mount a military threat to Israeli
Jerusalem. Back in 1967, in the
euphoria of an historic military victory and the absence of a convincing
Palestinian national movement, most Israelis were blind to the demographic
and political ramifications of the Jerusalem expansion scheme. We no longer
have that excuse. Successive Israeli governments and Jerusalem
municipalities have failed to provide a coherent political solution for more
than 200,000 Arab residents of the city whom Israel doesn't want but won't
let go of. The fence/wall in Jerusalem as currently planned will create
legions of newly embittered Palestinian Jerusalemites, including potential
terrorists, some within and some beyond the barrier, and will unfairly
disrupt the lives of hundreds of thousands more.
The fence is increasingly seen as defining a political as
well as a security border. In order to avoid a situation in which the
Jerusalem fence perpetuates a negative demographic dynamic and actually
worsens Israel's security situation, its path must be reconsidered. Even the
Israeli political right now increasingly acknowledges that the inclusion of
villages like Sur Baher within the Jerusalem municipal boundaries--soon to
be reaffirmed by the fence--is a mistake.
While in some parts of the north and south of the city the
fence's location makes sense, this is not the case to the east. Here a
decision must be taken, in some areas, to move the anti-terrorist barrier
closer to the border between the Jewish and Arab parts of Jerusalem, and in
other areas to rely on armed patrols rather than fences. While this is not
an optimal solution from a security, political, demographic, or humanitarian
standpoint, as a synthesis of these requirements it is certainly better than
the existing plan. Yossi Alpher is
coeditor of bitterlemons.org and bitterlemons-international.org. He is a
former director of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies and a former
senior adviser to PM Ehud Barak.
Published 21/6/2004©bitterlemons.org
Bitterlemons-international.org is an internet forum
for an array of world perspectives on the Middle East and its specific
concerns. It aspires to engender greater understanding about the Middle East
region and open a new common space for world thinkers and political leaders
to present their viewpoints and initiatives on the region. Editors Ghassan
Khatib and Yossi Alpher can be reached at
ghassan@bitterlemons-international.org and
yossi@bitterlemons-international.org, respectively.
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27-06-2004 |