Volker Perthes
Following the divisions over the Iraq war between the United States
and some of its key European allies as well as within the European Union
actors on both sides of the Atlantic have been trying to heal the wounds and
better prepare themselves for future challenges that may come up. On the
European side, where the split over Iraq was seen as a real threat to the
perspective of political integration, the EU has made an effort to unify its
perception of international and European security in its European Security
Strategy, adopted by the EU's heads of state and government in December
2003. At the same time, a quieter debate on how to deal with threats in the
world is being conducted between the United States and Europe in
transatlantic fora such as, among others, NATO and the G8.
The European Security Strategy describes the risks and threats which
Europe perceives as emanating from its geopolitical environment. Five "key
threats" are defined, namely terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organized crime,
including drug smuggling, illegal migration and trafficking in human beings.
It is noticeable that many of these risks and challenges emanate from, or
are in one way or other, a feature of Europe's southern neighborhood i.e.
the Middle East. The strategy points to the Middle East explicitly in its
dealing with proliferation and regional conflicts.
Somalia and Afghanistan are mentioned as examples for state failure; and
many European policy-makers are fearful that the American-led occupation of
Iraq will not actually bring about a stable and democratic new Iraq, but
another "failed," disintegrating state. Speaking of terrorism, the paper
mentions that this phenomenon has recently been mostly linked to "violent
religious extremism."
Europe has had its own experience with "secular" types of terrorism; and
the European Security Strategy expresses European thinking well, in not
confusing "Islam" and "terrorism." Instead, it points to the "complex
causes" of terrorism, including "the pressures of modernization, cultural,
social and political crises, and the alienation of young people living in
foreign societies." There is no doubt, however, that terrorism with Islamist
backgrounds is increasingly seen as a threat that demands international
action and cooperation including, as in the case of Afghanistan, military
means. At the same time, Europe does not fear any peaceful take-overs by
political Islamic parties; at least the decision-making elites are quite
aware that radical Islamists do not represent a majority in most Arab or
Muslim countries, and that any democratic transformation that would allow
regular and free elections would most likely reduce their appeal. The
experience of Turkey, where democratic competition has allowed a
conservative party with Islamist roots to become the force of reform, is
certainly reassuring in this respect.
In the transatlantic debate on common challenges and opportunities, the
Middle East again takes a pivotal position. There is agreement of sorts that
the Middle East will be in the center of international geopolitics for at
least the next decade to come; it will therefore also be a major issue for
EU-US cooperation. Note that the so-called US Greater Middle East Initiative
is still a project under construction which the US government is going to
present to its European allies at the coming NATO and G8 summits in June
2004. Not even the precise geopolitical content of the project has been
defined so far. US policy-makers see the initiative as a scheme that could
give new life to these transatlantic institutions. This may explain one of
its major weaknesses, namely that it is being discussed with the Europeans
on various levels, but not with the political and societal elites of the
states it deals with. Little wonder that so many Arab commentators perceive
it negatively as a dictate and not as an offer of cooperation.
Very generally, compared to European approaches, US strategies tend to be
more global, more security-biased, and based on certain perceptions of a
"moral order" of what is good and what is bad in the world. And, as the only
remaining world power, the United States gives less value to time-consuming
consultations with the objects of their policies. European strategies tend
to be more regional in focus the European Security Strategy is the most
"global" approach on offer from the European side and it is still, as shown,
heavily centered on developments in its immediate geopolitical neighborhood.
European policies also tend to be more multidimensional, and institutional.
In other words, Europe would see to it that security policies are not only
military policies, but be combined with political, economic, cultural
contents and means; and European policy-makers believe in the virtues of
institution-building processes, even if these processes are long-term
undertakings that do not yield the wished-for results within one legislative
(or presidential) term. The long-term, multilateral, multilevel and
multi-issue Barcelona process is a prime example of European approaches
toward its neighborhood; it also underlines the European preparedness to let
oneself in into sometimes time-consuming exercises of confidence-building
and consultation.
From this vantage point, European policy-makers would have preferred the
US initiative for the Middle East to take predictable Arab apprehensions
into considerations from the beginning: Any form of consultation with the
countries in question would likely have done away with the confrontational
subtext which it now includes. Such differences should not lead to wrong
conclusions, however: The EU and its member states are as intent as the US
administration to bridge transatlantic gaps, and they will not say "no" to
the American initiative. But they will certainly try to leave their mark on
any common transatlantic plan that will emerge from it.
